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THE EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
CRIME OF RAPE IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Phillip Weiner* 
Abstract: For centuries, rape has served as a weapon of war, despite crim-
inal prohibitions forbidding its use. Nevertheless, only in recent decades 
has international law made significant strides in defining and prosecuting 
rape as a war crime and crime against humanity. International criminal 
tribunals prosecuting crimes of sexual violence in prior conflict zones 
such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia have struggled 
to develop a coherent definition of the elements of rape. This is largely 
due to the unique aspects of consent and coercion that are inherent with-
in a surrounding context of armed conflict. This Article begins by explor-
ing the elements of rape as defined by the major international criminal 
tribunals existing today, and subsequently examines the manner in which 
each court considers proof of consent and coercion. It then surveys some 
of the recent and more progressive developments in rape law jurispru-
dence both domestically and internationally. Finally, this Article recom-
mends several specific steps that international criminal tribunals could 
employ to more effectively and equitably prosecute rape as a war crime 
and crime against humanity. 
Introduction 
 From time immemorial, soldiers have considered rape part of the 
spoils of war1 and—more recently—the crime of rape has been used as 
a wartime weapon or strategy.2 During the conflict in Rwanda in the 
1990s, the United Nations Special Rapporteur estimated that over 
250,000 women were raped, and it described the outrageous situation 
in the following terms: 
 
* © 2013, Phillip Weiner, former International Judge, Court of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina; J.D., Boston College Law School; B.A., Northeastern University. I would like to thank 
the staff of the Boston College Law Review for their editorial assistance. 
1 See Kelly Dawn Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in Interna-
tional War Crimes Tribunals 21, 33–34 (1997). 
2 See Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 950, 
1347–1352, 2070 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=buPK1wx% 
2bWSo%3d&tabid=215. 
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[A] great many women were raped; rape was the rule and its 
absence the exception. . . . 
. . . No account was taken of the person’s age or condition. . . . 
Under-age children and elderly women were not spared. Oth-
er testimonies mention cases of girls aged between 10 and 12. 
Pregnant women were not spared either. Women about to 
give birth or who had just given birth were also the victims of 
rape in the hospitals. . . . Women who were “untouchable” ac-
cording to custom (e.g. nuns) were also involved and even 
corpses, in the case of women who were raped just after being 
killed.3 
 Notwithstanding the prevalence of rape in times of war, prohibi-
tions against rape were seen as early as the first century.4 More recently, 
both international and domestic law have seen significant developments 
in the jurisprudence of the crime of rape over the past forty years.5 Re-
view of these developments, however, shows that international courts 
and tribunals are inconsistent in the way they understand the crime of 
rape, with differences centering primarily on the following issues: (1) 
whether force or lack of consent is an element of the crime; (2) whether 
a general or a more mechanical description of the sexual act must be 
used in the definition; and (3) how concern for fairness for the victim 
should be balanced with protection of the rights of the accused.6 
 Part I of this Article begins by describing how different interna-
tional courts have approached the elements of rape.7 Then, Part II ex-
amines how international law has treated consent and coercion with 
regard to rape.8 Part III analyzes how international rape law has pro-
                                                                                                                      
3 Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Rep. on the Situation of Hu-
man Rights in Rwanda, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶¶ 16–17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/68 
( Jan. 29, 1996) (by René Degni-Ségui). 
4 Patricia Viseur Sellers, Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The 
Prosecution of Sexual Violence in Conflict: The Importance of Human Rights as 
Means of Interpretation 6 (2007), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/ 
Paper_Prosecution_of_Sexual_Violence.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 130.00(8)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2013); Criminal Code, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 272 (Can.); Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 75(2)(b) (U.K.); see 
also People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1186–87 (Cal. 1994) (discussing the elimination of 
the requirements of resistance and threat of immediate bodily harm in California rape 
law); Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211, 217 n.7 (D.C. 1993) (noting the abolition of the 
requirement that the government offer corroboration of a sexual offense victim’s testi-
mony). 
6 See infra notes 11–129 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 11–129 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 130–159 and accompanying text. 
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gressed in recent decades.9 Finally, Part IV offers recommendations for 
how international courts should approach rape cases in the future.10 
I. Elements of the Crime of Rape 
A. The View of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 The first case to identify the elements of rape in an international 
setting was Prosecutor v. Akayesu, which was prosecuted before the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1998.11 In Akayesu, 
the accused was convicted of rape as a crime against humanity, in addi-
tion to genocide with rape as a predicate crime.12 Although the trial 
chamber in Akayesu recognized that there was no commonly accepted 
definition of the crime of rape in international law, it did not explore 
in depth how the crime is defined in various legal systems.13 Rather, the 
trial chamber defined rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”14 
The chamber further explained that 
                                                                                                                     
coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of 
physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other 
forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may consti-
tute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain cir-
cumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of 
Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women.15 
 By adopting the phrase “a physical invasion of a sexual nature,” the 
trial chamber rejected the traditional definition of rape.16 Traditionally, 
rape had been limited not only in terms of the gender of the perpetra-
tor and victim but also in terms of the prohibited act or acts.17 Reason-
 
9 See infra notes 160–198 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 199–215 and accompanying text. 
11 See Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 685–696 (Sept. 2, 1998), http://www. 
unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf. 
12 Id. ¶¶ 696, 734. 
13 See id. ¶ 686. 
14 Id. ¶ 598. 
15 Id. ¶ 688. 
16 See id. ¶ 598; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 33.01[A]–[B], at 
567 n.2, 568 (6th ed. 2012); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 17.2, at 
605, 610 (2d ed. 2003). 
17 See Dressler, supra note 16, § 33.01, at 567 n.2, 568; 2 LaFave, supra note 16, 
§ 17.1–.2, at 605, 610. 
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ing that “the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured 
in a mechanical description of objects or body parts,” the trial chamber 
provided broad latitude for the nature of the sexual acts included 
within the crime of rape.18 
 The Akayesu trial chamber’s expansive definition of rape diverges 
from the traditional definition in two specific ways.19 First, the cham-
ber’s definition includes forced oral or anal sex, as well as the insertion 
of a finger or tongue into the vagina. In contrast, under the traditional 
common law approach, those acts are classified as various sexual of-
fenses, including sodomy or some other form of sexual violence.20 Sec-
ond, because the Akayesu definition is gender neutral, a male could be 
a victim and a female could be a perpetrator.21 This diverges from the 
traditional common law understanding of rape as a crime that a male 
commits upon a female, allowing for conviction of a female only by vir-
tue of accomplice liability.22 
 The ICTR’s decision in Akayesu had two other notable features. 
First, although Akayesu required that the acts be committed under co-
ercive circumstances, the decision provided significant latitude in de-
termining what constitutes coercion.23 Second, the trial chamber’s def-
inition did not address the elements of lack of consent or mens rea, 
and the appeal in Akayesu did not raise any issues relating to the ele-
ments of the crime of rape.24 
 Four months after the ICTR trial chamber decision in Akayesu, in 
December 1998, a trial panel of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Prosecutor v. Furundžija charged the 
crime of rape as a violation of Common Article III of the Geneva Con-
ventions.25 Recognizing the absence of a generally accepted definition 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 597. 
19 See id.; Dressler, supra note 16, § 33.01[A], at 567 n.2; 2 LaFave, supra note 16, 
§ 17.2(a), at 610–11. 
20 See Dressler, supra note 16, § 33.01, at 567 n.2. 
21 See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 597. 
22 See 2 LaFave, supra note 16, § 17.2(a), at 610–11. 
23 See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 688. 
24 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 10 ( June 1, 
2001), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4084f42f4.pdf (summarizing the grounds of 
appeal); Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 688; see also Catharine A. MacKin-
non, Essay, Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu, 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 
940, 950 (2006) (“[T]he ICTR grasped that inquiring into individual consent to sex for acts 
that took place in a clear context of mass sexual coercion made no sense at all.”). 
25 Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 43, 274 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e. 
pdf. 
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of rape in international law,26 the ICTY drew “upon the general con-
cepts and legal institutions common to all the major legal systems of 
the world”27 to arrive at an “accurate definition of rape.”28 Whereas the 
chamber initially referred to the Akayesu definition, it later ignored it 
when constructing its own definition.29 
 The ICTY trial panel’s decision in Furundžija identified the follow-
ing elements of the crime of rape: 
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: 
 (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or 
 (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetra-
tor; 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim 
or a third person.30 
This definition followed more closely the traditional common law un-
derstanding of rape than did the ICTR’s definition of rape in Akayesu.31 
For example, the Furundžija definition required that the perpetrator be 
male unless a female had used an object or had served as an acces-
sory.32 Also, under the Furundžija definition, certain forms of sexual 
activity such as forced digital penetration did not constitute rape.33 Fur-
thermore, under the Furundžija definition, force or coercion was clearly 
an element of the crime.34 
 The Furundžija trial panel’s definition of rape went, to some ex-
tent, beyond the traditional definition of rape. For example, the deci-
sion classified forced oral sex as rape even though it noted that—in 
                                                                                                                      
26 Id. ¶ 175. 
27 Id. ¶ 178. 
28 Id. ¶ 177. 
29 See id. ¶ 176. 
30 Id. ¶ 185. 
31 See Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape 
Law Reforms, 39 Jurimetrics 119, 122 (1999) (“The traditional [definition] did not in-
clude attacks on male victims, acts other than sexual intercourse, sexual assaults with an 
object, or sexual assaults by a spouse.”). Compare id. (dictating elements that incorporate 
the gender of the accused), with Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 597 
(dictating a gender neutral set of elements). 
32 See Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 185; see also 3 Charles E. 
Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 279, at 36 (15th ed. 1993) (“Given the ordinary def-
inition of sexual intercourse, as at common law, rape may be committed only by a male 
and it may be committed only upon a female.”). 
33 See Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 185. 
34 See id. 
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some countries—forced oral sex constitutes only sexual assault.35 Find-
ing no violation of the nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without law”) 
principle, the panel justified this classification based on the serious na-
ture of the act.36 Moreover, the Furundžija trial judgment went beyond 
the traditional common law definition of rape by including “threats of 
force against . . . a third person,”37 to acknowledge the situation in 
which a woman agrees to sexual relations only in response to a threat 
made against her child or another family member.38 Similar language 
has been added to statutes dealing with the crime of rape in some 
common law jurisdictions.39 As in the ICTR’s Akayesu case, the appeal 
in Furundžija did not raise issues related to the ICTY trial chamber’s 
definition of the crime of rape.40 
                                                                                                                     
 In 2001, just over two years after Furundžija, the ICTY decided Pros-
ecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vokovic, the court’s seminal case relating to 
the crime of rape.41 In Kunarac, the accused were charged with the 
crime of rape as a violation of Common Article III and as a crime 
against humanity.42 The Kunarac trial judgment addressed all three 
principal inconsistencies in the definitions of the crime of rape under 
international law.43 
 As in Furundžija, the trial panel in Kunarac initially noted that 
there was no definition of the crime of rape in international humani-
tarian law or in the tribunal’s statute.44 Thus, in order to arrive at a 
proper definition, the trial panel conducted a survey to determine 
‘‘whether it is possible to identify certain basic principles, or . . . ‘com-
 
35 Id. ¶ 183. 
36 Id. ¶ 184. 
37 Id. ¶ 174. 
38 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Marković, Case No. X-KR-09/948, Trial Verdict, 40 (Court of 
Bosn. & Herz. Apr. 15, 2011) (analyzing a rape where the accused threatened to kill the 
victim’s brother), aff’d, Dec. 28, 2011; Prosecutor v. Nikačević, Case No. X-KR-08/500, Trial 
Verdict, 40, 42 (Court of Bosn. & Herz. Feb. 19, 2009) (same), aff’d, July 12, 2010. 
39 See e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 130.00(8)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2013); Criminal Code, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 272 (Can.); Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 75(2)(b) (U.K.). 
40 See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 207 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furund zja/ 
acjug/en/fur-aj000721e.pdf. 
41 See Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96–23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 436 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/ 
kun-tj010222e.pdf. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. ¶¶ 436–461. 
44 See id. ¶¶ 437, 439. Although Article 5(g) of the Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia identified rape as a potential crime, it did not iden-
tify its elements. See id. ¶¶ 436–437. 
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mon denominators’, in those legal systems which embody the principles 
which must be adopted in the international context.”45 
 Upon completing its survey, the trial panel found that 
the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is con-
stituted by: the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the 
vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or 
any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth 
of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sex-
ual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. 
Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as 
a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the 
surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to 
effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it oc-
curs without the consent of the victim.46 
This definition adopted a traditional formulation of the actus reus of 
rape.47 Section (a) and the first clause in section (b) were taken verba-
tim from the trial verdict in Furundžija.48 The Kunarac definition, how-
ever, removed “coercion or force or threat of force” from the Furundžija 
definition and instead adopted “lack of consent” as an element.49 At 
trial, the prosecutor argued that lack of consent was not an element of 
the crime of rape but force and coercion were.50 The trial panel dis-
agreed with the prosecutor based on its survey of major legal systems; it 
stated that “the basic underlying principle common to them was that 
sexual penetration will constitute rape if it is not truly voluntary or con-
sensual on the part of the victim.”51 
 The trial panel also added a two-part mens rea requirement, which 
further protects the rights of the accused.52 The mens rea element re-
quires not only proof of a general intent to effect the sexual act, but 
also proof that the accused knew the sexual act was taking place with-
                                                                                                                      
45 Id. ¶ 439 (footnote omitted). 
46 Id. ¶ 460. 
47 See Dressler, supra note 16, § 33.04[A], at 574; 2 LaFave, supra note 16, § 17.2, at 
609. 
48 See Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 185. 
49 Compare id. (defining rape as “sexual penetration . . . by coercion or force or threat 
of force”), with Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 460 (de-
fining rape as “sexual penetration . . . without the consent of the victim”). 
50 Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 461. 
51 Id. ¶¶ 439–441. 
52 See id. ¶ 460. 
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out the victim’s consent.53 This latter requirement would allow for a 
“reasonable mistake of fact” defense.54 The trial panel, however, did not 
provide any reasoning to support its requirement that the accused 
knew the victim did not consent. 
 On appeal, the appellants challenged the trial panel’s definition of 
rape.55 They argued that the “use of coercion or force” —as opposed to 
“lack of consent” —was a basic element of the crime of rape.56 The 
prosecution responded that the trial panel’s adopted definition was 
proper.57 The appeals panel rejected the appellants’ argument.58 The 
panel reasoned that “the trial chamber did not disavow the Tribunal’s 
earlier jurisprudence, but instead sought to explain the relationship 
between force and consent. Force or threat of force provides clear evidence of 
non-consent, but force is not an element per se of rape.”59 The appeals panel 
further noted that a “narrow focus on force or threat of force” would 
be inappropriate and allow for “perpetrators to evade liability.”60 
 By excluding force as an element of rape, the appeals panel signifi-
cantly changed the elements of the crime. The appeals panel stated that 
the trial panel did not reject the Furundžija definition of rape, but sim-
ply “sought to explain the relationship between force and consent.”61 
Close review of the decision, however, does not support this view. The 
elements of the actus reus identified in the two cases are clearly differ-
ent.62 In fact, force and consent have traditionally served as separate 
and distinct elements, “each of which must independently be satis-
                                                                                                                      
53 See id.; Rebecca L. Haffajee, Note, Prosecuting Crimes of Rape and Sexual Violence at the 
ICTR: The Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise Theory, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 201, 210 
(2006) (indicating that a ‘‘high standard for mens rea” was adopted by the ICTY in cases 
following Kunarac). 
54 See 2 LaFave, supra note 16, § 17.2(b), at 615–19; see also DPP v. Morgan, [1976] A.C. 
182 (H.L.) 203–04, 214, 215, 237, 239 (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that a mistake of 
fact as to consent must be genuine but need not be reasonable). 
55 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal 
Judgment, ¶ 125 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http://www. 
icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. ¶ 126. 
58 Id. ¶ 128. 
59 Id. ¶ 129 (emphasis added). 
60 Id. 
61 Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 129. 
62 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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fied.”63 Force, threats, and coercion focus on the acts of the accused, 
whereas voluntary consent relates to the mental state of the victim.64 
ally aligned.”71 
                                                                                                                     
 Almost three years later, in 2005, in Prosecutor v. Muhimana, an ICTR 
trial panel again considered the proper definition of the crime of 
rape.65 In that case, the accused was charged with rape as a crime 
against humanity.66 At trial, both the prosecution and the accused en-
dorsed the definition of rape as adopted in Akayesu.67 The trial chamber 
in Muhimana concluded that the two working definitions of rape (in 
Akayesu and Kunarac) are not incompatible.68 In its judgment, the trial 
chamber initially described the case law history of the crime of rape at 
the ICTY and ICTR, noting that some trial courts had followed the 
Kunarac definition whereas others had relied upon Akayesu.69 In review-
ing these cases, the trial chamber noted that the “Kunarac Appeals 
Chamber . . . was not called upon to consider the Akayesu definition.’’70 
The chamber further noted that, although the Kunarac definition had 
been viewed as a departure from the definition of rape adopted in 
Akayesu, the two definitions are actually “substanti
 The trial chamber explained the matter as follows: 
The Chamber takes the view that the Akayesu definition and 
the Kunarac elements are not incompatible or substantially 
different in their application. Whereas Akayesu referred 
broadly to a “physical invasion of a sexual nature”, Kunarac 
went on to articulate the parameters of what would constitute 
a physical invasion of a sexual nature amounting to rape.72 
Based on this reasoning, the ICTR trial chamber endorsed “the con-
ceptual definition of rape established in Akayesu, which encompasses 
 
63 See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 2001); 2 LaFave, supra note 
16, 
sent to Sexual Violence Under In-
tern
p:// 
www ortals/0/Case/English/Muhimana/decisions/muhimana280505.pdf. 
548. 
, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Trial Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 549. 
§ 17.4, at 637–38. 
64 See Wolfgang Schomburg & Ines Peterson, Genuine Con
ational Criminal Law, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 121, 138 (2007). 
65 Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Trial Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 536 (Apr. 28, 2005), htt
.unictr.org/P
66 Id. ¶ 534. 
67 Id. ¶ 535. 
68 Id. ¶ 550. 
69 Id. ¶¶ 537–
70 Id. ¶ 543. 
71 Muhimana
72 Id. ¶ 550. 
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th elements set out in Kunarac.”73 Utilizing this definition, the trial 
chamber determined that the accused was criminally liable.74 
 The trial chamber, however, did not explain how it reconciled the 
differing definitions of the crime of rape in Akayesu and Kunarac. Addi-
tionally, it did not explain how it applied the resulting definition to the 
facts of the case before
e 
 it. Consequently, the trial chamber in Muhimana 
ft 
uld be viewed in the same 
an
ime against humanity. The import 
f th
hed 
                                                                                                                     
le more questions about the elements of rape under international law 
open and undecided. 
 Fourteen months later, in 2006, in Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, the 
ICTR appeals chamber finally determined the proper definition of 
rape.75 In Gacumbitsi, the accused was convicted of rape as a crime 
against humanity.76 Arguing on appeal that the judgment should be 
affirmed, the prosecutor submitted that lack of consent and the ac-
cused’s knowledge thereof are not elements of the crime of rape.77 In-
stead, the prosecutor argued that rape sho
m ner “as torture or enslavement, for which the Prosecution is not 
required to establish absence of consent.”78 
 The appeals chamber rejected the prosecution’s argument, thus 
adopting the Kunarac definition of rape.79 The appeals chamber ex-
plained that “Kunarac establishes that non-consent and knowledge 
thereof are elements of rape as a cr
o is is that the Prosecution bears the burden of proving these ele-
ments beyond reasonable doubt.”80 
 Gacumbitsi finally reconciled the two divergent definitions of rape 
used in the ICTY and ICTR.81 This result is not surprising because the 
ICTY and ICTR share the same appeals chamber.82 In fact, four of the 
five appellate judges who sat on the Gacumbitsi appeal also participated 
in the Kunarac appeal.83 The Gacumbitsi appeal judgment establis
 
No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 152 ( July 7, 2006), http://www.uni 
ctr.o Case/English/Gachumbitsi/judgement/judgement_appeals_070706.pdf. 
TR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 152–153. 
ohamed 
 
73 Id. ¶ 551. 
74 Id. ¶¶ 552–553, 561–563. 
75 See Case 
rg/Portals/0/
76 Id. ¶ 3. 
77 Id. ¶ 147. 
78 Id. ¶ 149. 
79 Id. ¶ 152. 
80 Id. ¶ 153. 
81 See Gacumbitsi, Case No. IC
82 Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure 136 (2d ed. 2010). 
83 Each case involved an appellate panel consisting of five judges, with the same four 
judges sitting on both cases: Judge Mehmet Guney, Judge Theodor Meron, Judge M
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that a more tr  more ex-
ns
 the crime of rape for the ICC.84 
In th er 
rape he 
ICC 
ever slight, of any part of the 
r, 
l penetration by “any part of the body” would allow for 
the prosecution of rape when the forced act is by means of a finger or 
aditional definition of rape—as opposed to the
pa ive definition in Akayesu—applies in both the ICTY and ICTR. 
B. The International Criminal Court Definition 
 Those who established the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
had the opportunity to review and consider the ICTY and ICTR cases 
when they developed the elements of
e ICC, the elements of rape are the same, regardless of wheth
 is prosecuted as a war crime or as a crime against humanity.85 T
defines the actus reus of rape as: 
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct 
resulting in penetration, how
body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, 
or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object 
or any other part of the body. 
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force 
or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of powe
against such person or another person, or by taking advantage 
of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed 
against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.86 
The ICC derived this definition from the Akayesu, Furundžija, and Kuna-
rac judgments.87 The first paragraph effects a compromise between the 
traditional and the more expansive definitions of the sexual act of rape 
by allowing for prosecution of various forms of forced sexual activity 
not covered under most traditional definitions. Specifically, the refer-
ence to sexua
                                                                                                                      
Shahabuddeen, and Judge Wolfgang Schomburg. See Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, 
Appeal Judgment; Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Judgment. 
)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 
(200  Statute]; see Rome Statute, supra note 
84, a
84 The Rome Statute of the ICC (“Rome Statute”) established the ICC. See generally 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute] (establishing the ICC and including rape as a crime against 
humanity and a war crime). 
85 Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court, 1st Sess., 
Sept. 3–10, 2002, art. 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2
2) [hereinafter Assembly of Parties to the Rome
rt. 7–8 (outlining rape as a war crime and crime against humanity). 
86 Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 85, art. 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-
1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1 (footnotes omitted). 
87 See supra notes 11–74 and accompanying text. 
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th ongue. The definition is also gender neutral as to both perpetrator 
and victim.
e t
 anticipate the full range of circumstances 
risi
nition corresponds with 
ce
                                                                                                                     
88 
 Unlike the definition of rape used in the ICTY and ICTR, which 
requires “absence of consent,” the ICC utilizes “force or coercion” as an 
element.89 The ICC’s definition gives broad latitude to the terms “coer-
cion” and “force” in order to
a ng in wartime. In particular, a threat against a third person is suffi-
cient to satisfy this element. 
 Finally, the ICC’s definition and treatment of consent tracks trends 
in domestic approaches to rape. By including language concerning acts 
“committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent,’’ the 
ICC’s definition recognizes that certain persons, due to age, mental or 
physical condition, or infirmity, are incapable of providing consent to 
sexual activity.90 This feature of the ICC defi
re nt domestic legislative modifications that protect persons who, for 
various reasons, lack the capacity to consent.91 
 Although mens rea is not included within the elements of the 
crime, Article Thirty of the Rome Statute of the ICC (“Rome Statute”) 
requires that the “material elements are committed with intent and 
knowledge.”92 Therefore, to have the required mens rea, the perpetra-
tor must (1) intend to invade the body of a person resulting in penetra-
tion, and (2) know that the invasion was committed through the use of 
force, threats, coercion, or by taking advantage of a coercive environ-
 
88 This is an important modification because men were also victims of rape during the 
/www.icty.org/x/cases/cesic/tjug/en/ces-tj040311e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Todorovic, 
Cas
te, supra note 85, art. 7(1)(g)-1, 
8(2
e)(vi)-1; see also Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-
200
tabid=106 (noting that “[c]hildren below the age of 14 cannot 
give
armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lazarević, Stanojević & 
Ostojić, Case No. X-KRŽ-06/243, Trial Verdict, ¶¶ 195, 197, 201 (Court of Bosn. & Herz. 
Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.worldcourts.com/wcsbih/eng/decisions/2010.09.22_Prose- 
cutors_Office_of_BiH_v_Lazarevic_et_al.pdf; Prosecutor v. Češić, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, 
Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 52 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2004), 
http:/
e No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 36–41 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 31, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/todorovic/tjug/en/tod-tj010731e. 
pdf. 
89 Compare Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statu
)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1 (“The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion.”), with Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 154 (“[A]bsence of 
consent . . . is an element of the crime.”) (quoting Kunarac). 
90 See Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 85, art. 7(1)(g)-1, 
8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(
4-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 694 ( June 20, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx? 
fileticket=EqikfVSpLWM=&
 valid consent”). 
91 See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 130.05(3) (McKinney Supp. 2013); Sexual Offences Act, 
2003, c. 42, § 30–33 (U.K.). 
92 Rome Statute, supra note 84, art. 30(1). 
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ment, or a person incapable of voluntarily consenting.93 Thus, al-
though the ICC definition of rape does not explicitly require knowl-
edge of “lack of consent,” it does provide a two-part mens rea require-
ment that 
t humanity.96 After reviewing the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY fini-
tion 
rpetrator or 
ent of the crime of rape.99 Also, as in Kunarac, the 
rim
allows for a mistake of fact defense.94 
C. Elements Defined by the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
 The Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) has also dealt with the 
issue of defining the crime of rape.95 Initially, in the 2007 case of Prose-
cutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, the accused were charged with rape as a 
crime agains
, ICTR, and ICC, the trial chamber adopted the following de
of rape: 
1. The non-consensual penetration, however slight, of the va-
gina or anus of the victim by the penis of the pe
by any other object used by the perpetrator, or of the mouth 
of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; and 
2. The intent to effect this sexual penetration, and the 
knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.97 
This definition is similar to the one that the ICTY trial chamber adopted 
in Kunarac.98 As in Kunarac, the Brima trial chamber explained that 
“force or threat of force” were factors establishing “lack of consent,” but 
were not an elem
B a trial chamber did not provide any basis for an enhanced mens rea 
requirement.100 
                                                                                                                      
93 See Eve La Haye, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)—Rape, Sexual Slavery, Enforced Prostitution, Forced 
Pregnancy, Enforced Sterilization, Sexual Violence, in The International Criminal Court: Ele-
men
es a defendant from forming or 
mai
15-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 143; Brima, Case No. SCSL-
200
CSL-2004-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 14, 210. 
22, 2008), 
http yBfVgg%3d&tabid=173. 
ts of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 184, 190 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001). 
94 See Rome Statute, supra note 84, art. 30(1); see also Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: 
Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About Consent in Rape, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
815, 817 (1996) (“Where an offense requires a particular mental state, such as knowledge 
or purpose, an honest and reasonable belief that preclud
ntaining that mental state will preclude conviction.”). 
95 See, e.g., Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-
4-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 14, 210. 
96 Case No. S
97 Id. ¶ 693. 
98 See Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 460. 
99 See id. ¶ 458, 460; Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 694. 
100 See Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 460; Brima, 
Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 694. On appeal from the trial judgment in 
Brima, the parties did not contest the definition of the crime of rape. Prosecutor v. Brima, 
Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 28–30 (Feb. 
://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=cXQsd
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 Two years later, in the 2009 case Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, a 
trial chamber of the SCSL adopted a different definition of the crime 
of ra 101 ime 
agai war 
crim
owever slight, of any part of the body 
 power 
rson incapable of giving genuine consent; 
sonable knowledge that this was likely to 
 wo 
para the 
cham : 
                                                                                                                     
pe.  In that case, the accused were charged with rape as a cr
nst humanity.102 The chamber reviewed the history of rape as a 
e and identified the elements as follows: 
(i) The Accused invaded the body of a person by conduct re-
sulting in penetration, h
of the victim or of the Accused with a sexual organ, or of the 
anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any 
other part of the body; 
(ii) The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of 
force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, du-
ress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of
against such person or another person or by taking advantage 
of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed 
against a pe
(iii) The Accused intended to effect the sexual penetration 
or acted in the rea
occur; and 
(iv) The Accused knew or had reason to know that the victim 
did not consent.103 
The first two paragraphs derive from the ICC’s definition of rape.104 
The third and fourth paragraphs emanate from the Kunarac trial 
judgment, and are not included in the ICC elements.105 
The Sesay decision elaborated on the language used in the first t
graphs of this definition.106 With regard to the first paragraph, 
ber explained the wide latitude given to sexual acts, noting that
The first element of the actus reus defines the type of invasion 
that is required to constitute the offence of rape and covers 
two types of penetration, however slight. The first part of the 
 
101 Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 145. 
102 See id. ¶ 143. 
103 Id. ¶ 145 (footnote omitted). 
104 See Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 85, art. 7(1)(g)-1, 
8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1. 
105 See id.; Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 460. Al-
though the third paragraph does not fall within the ICC’s definition of rape, the ICC in-
corporates a similar mens rea requirement pursuant to Article Thirty of the Rome Statute. 
See Rome Statute, supra note 84, art. 30(1) (requiring the material elements of a crime to 
be “committed with intent and knowledge”). 
106 See Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 146–148. 
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provision refers to the penetration of any part of the body of 
either the victim or the Accused with a sexual organ. The “any 
part of the body” in this part includes genital, anal or oral 
penetration. The second part of the provision refers to the 
penetration of the genital or anal opening of the victim with 
any object or any other part of the body. This part is meant to 
cover penetration with something other than a sexual organ 
l as both men and women can be victims of rape.107 
 aph 
as fo
t the circumstances that prevail in most 
 act. A per-
paragraph), “lack of consent” is not an element of this definition.110 In 
                          
which could include either other body parts or any other ob-
ject. This definition of invasion is broad enough to be gender 
neutra
The decision went on to explain the role of the second paragr
llows: 
The second element of the actus reus of rape refers to the cir-
cumstances which would render the sexual act in the first el-
ement criminal. The essence of this element is that it de-
scribes those circumstances in which the person could not be 
said to have voluntarily and genuinely consented to the act. 
The use or threat of force provides clear evidence of non-
consent, but it is not required. The ICTY Appeals Chamber 
has emphasized tha
cases charged as either war crimes or crimes against humanity 
will be almost universally coercive. That is to say, true consent 
will not be possible. 
. . . The last part of this element refers to those situations 
where, even in the absence of force or coercion, a person 
cannot be said to genuinely have consented to the
son may not, for instance, be capable of genuinely consenting 
if he or she is too young, under the influence of some sub-
stance, or suffering from an illness or disability.108 
 The above explanation in relation to the second paragraph of the 
definition is confusing. Paragraph 147 of the decision refers to the 
Kunarac appeal judgment as describing circumstances relating to “lack 
of consent.”109 Other than the limited circumstances in the final por-
tion of the second element (which are not being construed in this 
                                                                                            
tnotes omitted). 
8 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). 
107 Id. ¶ 146 (foo
108 Id. ¶¶ 147–14
109 See id. ¶ 147. 
110 See id. ¶ 145. 
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fact, this portion of the definition derives from the ICC elements of the 
crime of rape, where “lack of consent” was rejected as an element.111 
ad adopted, 
in the area was generally very difficult.119 
s a
Consequently, it is unclear what this reasoning in Sesay was intended to 
accomplish. 
 The Sesay decision also added a two-part mens rea requirement.112 
As noted, the mens rea requirement for lack of consent was not in-
cluded in the ICC’s definition, but rather derived from the Kunarac 
trial judgment.113 The Sesay decision provided no explanation for in-
cluding this special mens rea.114 Moreover, because lack of consent was 
not an element of the definition that this trial chamber h
there was no reason to require that the accused possess some level of 
knowledge that the victim was not consenting to the act.115 
 Although the issue of mens rea played no significant role in the 
Sesay case, it was an important issue in the Kunarac trial judgment.116 In 
Kunarac, the accused submitted that he was unaware that another sol-
dier had threatened to kill the victim if she did not “satisfy the desires 
of his commander,” and thus believed that the victim voluntarily con-
sented to sexual relations with him.117 The trial panel rejected this posi-
tion, finding instead that the accused possessed knowledge of certain 
circumstances that illustrated the victim’s lack of consent.118 The ac-
cused was aware that the victim was a detainee, that she and other 
women were being raped, that she was in fear for her life, and that the 
situation for Muslim women 
A  result, the accused knew that the victim was not voluntarily con-
senting to sexual activity.120 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 85, art. 7(1)(g)-1, 
8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1. 
112 See Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 145. 
113 Compare Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 85, art. 7(1)(g)-1, 
8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1 (illustrating that knowledge of lack of consent is not an ICC 
element of rape), with Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 460 
(requiring knowledge of lack of consent). 
114 See Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 143–148. 
115 Issues relating to the definition of the crime of rape were not raised on appeal. See 
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 85–92 
(Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CGgVJRfNF7M%3d&tabid= 
218. 
116 See Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 645–647; 
Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 143–148. 
117 Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 645–647. 
118 Id. ¶¶ 646–647. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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 A review of the mens rea requirement in Sesay, however, indicates 
that it is different from the mens rea requirement adopted in the Kuna-
rac trial judgment. Recall that the Kunarac mens rea elements required 
the “intention to effect . . . sexual penetration, and the knowledge that 
it occurs without the consent of the victim.”121 In contrast, the Sesay de-
cision allows for the prosecutor to establish an accused’s mens rea in 
different ways.122 The first part of the mens rea element calls for proof 
that the accused “intended to effect the sexual penetration or acted in 
the reasonable knowledge that this was likely to occur.”123 The second 
part calls for proof that the accused either “knew or had reason to know 
that the victim did not consent.”124 With regard to the latter require-
ment, it may be deemed proven “if the Prosecution establishes beyond 
reasonable doubt that the accused was aware, or had reason to be 
aware, of the coercive circumstances that undermined the possibility of 
genuine consent.”125 The “had reason to know” clause allows the prose-
cution to e the ac-
criminal law.127 Although the ICC definition appears to be the most 
progressive, the second part of its mens rea element unnecessarily al-
                                                                                                                     
stablish the required mens rea in situations where 
cused denies having actual knowledge of the alleged victim’s lack of 
consent.126 
D. Conclusions from the International Tribunals’ Definitions 
 Although there has been a great deal of jurisprudence discussing 
the definition of the crime of rape over the past fourteen years, there is 
still no consensus as to the appropriate definition in international 
 
 Trial Judgment, ¶ 145. 
 which would have put him on 
noti
es being committed, but was still liable because he had reason to 
kno
 
121 Id. ¶ 460. 
122 Case No. SCSL-04-15-T,
123 Id. (emphasis added). 
124 Id. (emphasis added). 
125 Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 157; cf. Prosecutor v. 
Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 91, 95 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/hadzihasa 
novic_kubura/tjug/en/had-judg060315e.pdf (noting that the mens rea for command 
responsibility requires that the accused “knew or had reason to know that his subordinates 
were about to commit a crime or had done so,” and explaining that the latter requirement 
may be satisfied if “specific information was available to him
ce of offences committed or about to be committed”). 
126 See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 299–301 & 
n.748 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/ 
cases/strugar/acjug/en/080717.pdf (referring to cases where a commander had no actual 
knowledge of the crim
w of the crimes). 
127 See supra notes 11–126 and accompanying text.
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lows the introduction of a mistake of fact defense.128 Thus, each of the 
definitions that the tribunals have adopted presents various issues and 
questions for further review. Part IV of this Article will provide recom-
mendations
ed as to whether any real consent 
 po
                                                                                                                     
 for modifying these definitions.129 
II. Proving Lack of Consent and Coercion 
A. Proof of Consent and Coercion in the International Criminal Tribunals 
 Each of the cases mentioned in Part I considers the relationship 
between the circumstances of the alleged rape and the need to prove 
the elements of non-consent or coercion.130 In these cases, the courts 
recognize that the situation during wartime is quite different from the 
circumstances in a national jurisdiction in peacetime. In such coercive 
circumstances, a question may be rais
is ssible.131 Each of the courts indicated that numerous factors could 
vitiate consent or establish coercion. 
 Initially, the tribunals recognized the circumstances inherent dur-
ing wartime situations that would establish the necessary element of 
coercion or would vitiate true consent. For example, the Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu trial judgment explained that a show of physical force is not 
necessary to establish coercive circumstances.132 Forms of duress, such 
 
/ 
inherent in armed conflict and refu-
gee
the nub 
of c
es in victims’ 
test f presumed post-traumatic and extreme stress disorders). 
128 See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
129 See infra notes 199–215 and accompanying text. 
130 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-
T, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 129 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf (holding that force, 
although not an element of rape, is clear evidence of lack of consent); Prosecutor v. Fu-
rundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e. 
pdf (holding that coercion includes threats made against a third person); Gacumbitsi v. 
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 153 ( July 7, 2006), http:/
www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Gachumbitsi/judgement/judgement_appeals_ 
070706.pdf (holding that lack of consent is an element of rape); Prosecutor v. Muhimana, 
Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Trial Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 550 (Apr. 28, 2005), http://www. 
unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Muhimana/decisions/muhimana280505.pdf (endors-
ing a broad definition of coercion); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judg-
ment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2, 1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/ 
judgement/akay001.pdf (holding that coercion may be 
 crises); supra notes 11–126 and accompanying text. 
131 See Schomburg & Peterson, supra note 64, at 138 (noting that genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes occur during inherently coercive circumstances that 
make “genuine consent . . . impossible,” and thus “consent cannot be considered 
rimes of sexual violence within the framework of international criminal law”). 
132 Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 688 (assessing inconsistenci
imony in light o
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as threats or intimidation, may constitute coercion because they prey 
on the fear or desperation of victims.133 These pressures, in turn, may 
be inherent in armed conflicts or refugee crises involving a military 
presence.134 Similarly, the Prosecutor v. Muhimana trial judgment rea-
soned that most cases charged under international criminal law, includ-
ing genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, will almost uni-
versally involve coercive circumstances.135 Furthermore, the Prosecutor v. 
Furundžija trial judgment established a standard for dealing with rape 
court is free to infer non-consent from the attendant 
an inmate.140 Although the 
am
                                                                                                                     
cases emanating from prison camps or detention facilities, holding that 
the circumstances surrounding captivity preclude consent.136 
 As such, the Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor appeal judgment noted that the 
existence of these circumstances of detention is sufficient for proving, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, lack of consent.137 The appeals chamber 
explained that a 
circumstances, notwithstanding the victim’s or perpetrator’s other rele-
vant conduct.138 
 The Prosecutor v. Kunarac appeal judgment even referred to domes-
tic laws where there is a presumption of lack of consent, thus trans-
forming sexual intercourse into rape.139 Specifically, the appeals cham-
ber referred to statutes imposing strict liability in the case of sexual 
relations between a prison guard and 
ch ber noted that such laws highlight “the need to presume non-
consent,” it did not adopt this position.141 
 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Trial Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 546; accord 
Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 130. 
136 Furundžija, Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 271; accord Prosecutor v. Kvočka, 
Radić, Žigić & Prcać, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 396 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/acjug/en/kvo-aj 
050228e.pdf. 
137 Gacumbitsi, No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 155. 
138 Id. 
139 Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 130–131 & 
nn.161–64. 
140 Id. ¶ 131 n.163 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2(c)(2) (West 2012) (prohibiting 
sexual penetration of a person in prison by an actor who has supervisory or disciplinary 
authority over the victim)). 
141 Id. ¶¶ 131, 133; see also Schomburg & Peterson, supra note 64, at 138–39 (“[V]arious 
states criminalize sexual acts between individuals in unequal positions of power, irrespective 
of the consent of the victim. If international criminal law relied at all on domestic law to de-
fine sexual violence, it should draw from such examples instead of general provisions that 
focus on consent.” (footnote omitted)). 
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 Although tribunals have spoken approvingly of a presumption of 
non-consent or coercion during detention or in other war crimes situa-
tions, they have failed to adopt this position.142 This failure apparently 
stems from the tension related to balancing the need for fairness to the 
victim against the need to protect the rights of the accused. A review of 
the decisions construing ICTY rules dealing with the issue of consent 
illustrates this ten
threats.144 Similar rules were adopted for courts and tribunals in 
Rw 145 146 147
sion. 
B. The ICTY Rules Relating to Consent 
 Rule 96 of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence sets pa-
rameters for the tribunal’s consideration of consent.143 In general, con-
sent cannot be a defense if a victim has been subjected to coercive cir-
cumstances or if the victim reasonably believes that submitting to a 
perpetrator’s demands will prevent subjecting a third party to similar 
anda,  Sierra Leone,  and Bosnia and Herzegovina,  as well as 
                                                                                                                      
142 See, e.g., Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 155 (noting that 
the trial chamber is free to infer non-consent from background circumstances such as 
genocide or detention); Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Judgment, 
¶¶ 
. & Evid. 96, http://www.icty. 
org/x v48_en.pdf. The perti-
nent p
 
pression, or 
ore evidence of the victim’s consent is admitted, the accused shall sat-
isfy the Trial Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and credible 
Id. 
 
m. Ct. R. P. & Evid. 70(a)–(c), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_ 
menus NG. 
08Feb
 force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive envi-
 
131, 133 (noting that it is a federal offense in the United States for a prison guard to 
have sexual relations with an inmate regardless of whether or not the inmate consents). 
143 Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia R. P
/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032Re
rt of o ion Rule 96 states that in cases of sexual assault: 
(ii) consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim
 (a) has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear vio-
lence, duress, detention or psychological op
 (b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might 
be so subjected, threatened or put in fear; 
(iii) bef
. . . . 
144 Id. 
145 Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda R. P. & Evid. 96(ii)–(iii), http://www.unictr.org/ 
Portals/0/English/Legal/ROP/100209.pdf. 
146 Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone R. P. & Evid. 96(i)–(iii), http://www.sc-sl.org/Link 
Click.aspx?fileticket=Psp%2bFh0%2bwSI%3d&tabid=176. This portion of the Rule was
taken verbatim from Int’l Cri
/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/Documents/RPE.4th.E
1200.pdf. Rule 70 states: 
In cases of sexual violence, the Court shall be guided by and, where appropri-
ate, apply the following principles: 
(a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim 
where
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1227 
for the International Criminal Court.148 Relying on Rule 96, the prose-
cution argued in Kunarac that lack of consent was not an element of 
rape, but rather that consent was an affirmative defense.149 The trial 
chamber, however, rejected this argument, reasoning that lack of con-
sent is an element of the crime of rape and that Rule 96 refers to some, 
but obviously not all, of the matters that negate consent.150 The cham-
ber explained that when a witness is subjected to the factors listed in the 
second paragraph of Rule 96, such as threats, duress, detention, or be-
ing put in fear, the victim cannot freely give consent, thereby satisfying 
the second prong of the trial chamber’s definition of the crime of 
rape.151 
 After determining that such circumstances negate consent, the 
chamber then referred to the factors listed in Rule 96, stating that “the 
reference to them . . . serves to reinforce the requirement that consent 
will be considered to be absent in those circumstances unless freely 
given.”152 This sentence is not only internally conflicting, but is at vari-
ance with the prior sentence and the Rule.153 Specifically, the chamber 
                                                                                                                      
nt; 
(c) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resis-
264(3)–(5), http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/co 
dexter/So inal 
%20P
 criminal offense against humanity and values protected 
(5) The motion, supporting documents and the record of the hearing must 
e Court orders otherwise. 
Id. 
. Ct. R. P. & Evid. 70(a)–(c). 
, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 461. 
, Trial Judgment, ¶ 464 (implying that voluntary consent is still possible, notwith-
 
ronment undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine con-
sent; 
(b) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim 
where the victim is incapable of giving genuine conse
tance by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence . . . . 
Id. 
147 Crim. P. Code of Bosn. & Herz. art. 
urce/country_profiles/legislation/CT%20Legislation%20-%20BiH%20Crim
rocedure%20Code.pdf. Rule 264 states: 
(3) In the case of the
by the international law, the consent of the victim may not be used in a [sic] 
favor of the defense. 
(4) Before admitting evidence pursuant to this Article, the Court must con-
duct an appropriate hearing in camera. 
be sealed in a separate envelope, unless th
148 Int’l Crim
149 Kunarac
150 Id. ¶ 464. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. (emphasis added). 
153 Compare Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia R. P. & Evid. 96 (eliminat-
ing consent as a possible defense when violence, duress, detention, or psychological op-
pression are present or reasonably feared), with Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-
23/1-T
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initially stated that there can be no voluntary consent if the referenced 
circumstances exist, but then indicated that a person can still voluntar-
ily consent in such circumstances.154 It appears that the chamber— at-
tempting to balance the rights of the victim and those of the accused— 
ludes that, under the circumstances, the con-
e of rape, the courts and tribunals will 
continue to deal with this matter. 
III. Progressive ions in Dealing  
ary 
matters.160 This Part highlights some of the most notable examples. 
                                                                                                                     
took great effort to avoid establishing a strict liability crime.155 
 The prosecution in the Gacumbitsi appeal raised a similar issue.156 
The appeals chamber stated that Rule 96 simply describes when 
evidence of consent is admissable.157 The panel explained that although 
the accused may introduce evidence of consent to create a reasonable 
doubt defense, such evidence may still be inadmissible pursuant to Rule 
96(ii).158 Additionally, a trial chamber is free to disregard admitted evi-
dence of consent if it conc
sent was not voluntary.159 
 These are just some of the many issues that relate to the element of 
lack of consent. Whether construing Rule 96 or determining whether 
consent is an element of the crim
Policies and Determinat
with the Crime of Rape 
 Although courts and tribunals continue to struggle over substan-
tive issues relating to the crime of rape, rules and decisions indicate 
that some advances have been made on procedural and evidenti
 
standing the presence or threat of violence, duress, detention, or psychological oppres-
sion). 
154 See Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 464. 
155 See id. Although the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a statute prohibiting the 
use of the consent defense in war crimes cases alleging rape, such defenses are apparently 
still allowed to protect the rights of the accused. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Pinčić, Case No. X-KR-
08/502, Trial Verdict, 16, 41 (Ct. of Bosn. & Herz. Nov. 28, 2008); see also Claire de Than & 
Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights 359 (2003) (noting that 
the final version of Rule 96 appears to be the result of a “compromise between the rights of 
the defendant and victim”). 
156 See Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 155. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. ¶ 156; Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia R. P. & Evid. 96. 
159 Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 156. 
160 See infra notes 161–198 and accompanying text. 
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A. Corroboration of the Victim’s Testimony Is Not Required 
 For many years, certain jurisdictions required corroboration of a 
victim’s testimony in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of 
rape.161 The requirement of corroboration emanates from Lord Chief 
Justice Hale’s assertion in the latter part of the seventeenth century that 
ape “r is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and 
harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.”162 
One of the key reasons for this requirement is the unsupported view 
that false rape charges outnumber false charges of other crimes.163 
 This requirement has now been abandoned in a number of juris-
dictions.164 For example, over the past fifty years in the United States, a 
number of states have repealed the corroboration requirement.165 Most 
of the war crimes tribunals have also rejected the outdated corrobora-
tion requirement.166 The ICTY, ICTR, and ICC have adopted proce-
dural rules indicating that corroboration of the victim’s testimony is 
not required in cases of sexual assault or violence.167 As such, in 1997, 
in Prosecutor v. Tadić, the ICTY trial chamber explained that the rule 
rejecting a corroboration requirement in sexual assault cases “accords 
to the testimony of a victim of sexual assault the same presumption of 
reliability as the testimony of victims of other crimes, something long 
                                                                                                                      
161 Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale L.J. 1365, 1367 
(1972) [hereinafter Repeal Not Reform]; see, e.g., Davis v. State, 48 S.E. 180, 181 (Ga. 1904) 
(requiring corroboration to prove rape); State v. Connelly, 59 N.W. 479, 481 (Minn. 1894) 
(rea
hert
irement); Hodges v. State, 197 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Ark. 1946) (same); McQueary v. Peo-
ple,
e/IT 
ing corrobora-
tion ony); Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone R. P. & Evid., http://www.sc-sl. 
org/
soning that any woman who is actually raped would likely tell a third person about the 
incident). 
162 1 Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 634 (Thomas Dog-
y ed., E. Rider, Little-Britain 1800) (1736). 
163 See United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
164 See, e.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 274 (Can.) (repudiating the corrobora-
tion requ
 110 P. 210, 212–13 (Colo. 1910) (same); State v. Bashaw, 672 P.2d 48, 49 (Or. 1983) 
(same). 
165 See United States v. Sheppard, 569 F.2d 114, 117 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Hodges, 197 
S.W.2d at 53; Bashaw, 672 P.2d at 49; Repeal Not Reform, supra note 161, at 1367. 
166 See Int’l Crim. Ct. R. P. & Evid. 63(4), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal 
%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/Documents/RPE.4th.ENG.08Feb1200.pdf; 
Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda R. P. & Evid. 96(i), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/ 
English/Legal/ROP/100209.pdf; Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia R. P. & 
Evid. 96(i), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidenc
032Rev48_en.pdf. But see generally Crim. P. Code of Bosn. & Herz. (2003), http://www. 
coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Source/country_profiles/legislation/CT%20Legislation%20-
%20BiH%20Criminal%20Procedure%20Code.pdf (providing no rule regard
 of a rape victim’s testim
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Psp%2bFh0%2bwSI%3d&tabid=176 (same). 
167 See supra note 166. 
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denied to victims of sexual assault by the common law.”168 Even in cases 
where the accused argues that a victim’s age or personal trauma un-
dermines his or her credibility, the corroboration requirement has 
been consistently rejected.169 
 overpowered”172 has been rejected as unreason-
B. Rejection of a “Resistance Requirement” 
 The resistance requirement is a common law feature that has been 
the subject of criticism in recent times.170 As with the corroboration 
rule, the resistance requirement is based on the practice of distrusting 
the testimony of an alleged rape victim.171 In some jurisdictions within 
the United States, the requirement that a victim resist to the “utmost” 
or “until exhausted or
able and outdated.173 
 The international criminal tribunals have also rejected this re-
quirement. Although the accused argued in the 2002 Prosecutor v. Kuna-
rac ICTY appeal judgment that “continuous” and “genuine” resistance 
should be an element of rape, the chamber summarily rejected that 
                                                                                                                      
168 Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Opinion & Judgment, ¶ 536 & n.33 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the 
, 2001), http:// 
www
, 721 P.2d 110, 117 (Cal. 1986) (criticizing the “utmost re-
sista
arding sexual assault”); People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 
247,
74) (holding that a woman must re-
sist 
tate v. Mackor, 527 A.2d 710, 714–15 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (same); State v. 
McK
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj 
70507JT2-e.pdf (citing 1 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 263 (1995)). 
169 See e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vokovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 
Trial Judgment, ¶ 566 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22
.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case 
No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 271 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 
1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf. 
170 See, e.g., People v. Barnes
nce” requirement as primitive); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1091 (1986) 
(arguing that the continued use of the resistance requirement provides evidence that sex-
ism pervades the law of rape). 
171 Barnes, 721 P.2d at 117–18 (noting that the resistance requirement “appears to have 
been grounded in the basic distrust with which courts and commentators traditionally 
viewed a woman’s testimony reg
 251–52 (Cal. 1975) (describing the trial court’s warning that an unchaste woman is 
less likely to be credible); Estrich, supra note 170, at 1105 (noting that distrust of women is 
pervasive in the law of rape). 
172 See, e.g., People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 384 (18
to the “extent of her ability”); Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wis. 1906) (requiring 
the alleged rape victim to demonstrate “the most vehement exercise of every physical 
means or faculty” to prove that a rape has occurred). 
173 See, e.g., Barnes, 721 P.2d at 117 (noting that only force, not resistance, is required to 
prove rape); S
night, 774 P.2d 532, 534 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that only reasonable, rather 
than utmost, resistance is required, while taking into account the circumstances surround-
ing the act). 
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argument.174 The appeals tribunal further noted that the appellant’s 
contention that a requirement of continuous resistance is necessary to 
provide notice of non-consent “is wrong on the law and absurd on the 
facts.”175 This same argument was raised and rejected in the 2005 ICTY 
appeal judgment in Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Radić, Žigić & Prcać.176 Al-
though the argument has not been raised since or adopted as an ele-
ment of the crime of rape by any tribunal, some form of this rule is still 
a requirement in some American states.177 
 of rape from reporting their crimes to law 
fo
                                                                                                                     
C. Rape Shield Rules 
 For many years, at a trial for rape the defense attorneys would 
place the alleged victim on trial by inquiring into her prior sexual activ-
ity and introducing evidence of her lack of chastity.178 This strategy re-
sulted in harassment and further humiliation of the victim, and also 
served to discourage victims
en rcement authorities.179 
 Rape shield rules or statutes were introduced to eliminate this 
common defense strategy.180 Similarly, war crimes courts and tribunals 
have accepted the concept of, and need for, rape shield rules to protect 
victims from harassing questions that are not relevant to the issues at 
 
 v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal 
Judg
977) (illustrating the courtroom tactic of placing the victim “on 
trial
.E.2d 58, 65 (Mass. 
200
mpetus for the passage of rape 
shie
174 Prosecutor
ment, ¶¶ 125, 128 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http:// 
www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf. 
175 Id. ¶ 128. 
176 Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 393, 395 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/acjug/en/kvo-aj 
050228e.pdf. 
177 See, e.g., People v. Dorsey, 429 N.Y.2d 828, 832 (1980) (noting that New York re-
quires only a showing of “earnest resistance”); McKnight, 774 P.2d at 534 (noting that proof 
of rape requires a showing of reasonable resistance in Washington). 
178 See Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1
”); see also People v. Collins, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (Ill. 1962) (noting that it is more likely 
that an unchaste woman assented to sexual activity); People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 195–
96 (N.Y. 1838) (same). 
179 See, e.g., Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 685 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing how a trial 
forces humiliation upon rape victims); Commonwealth v. Harris, 825 N
5) (same); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair 
Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1013, 1062–63 (1991) (noting that rape 
victims often do not press charges in order to avoid the ordeal of trial). 
180 See, e.g., Bloch, 156 F.3d at 685 (noting that one i
ld statutes is the need to protect victims from personal attacks); Harris, 825 N.E.2d at 
65; Torrey, supra note 179, at 1062–63 (noting that rape shield laws were passed in order to 
alleviate the burdens placed on rape victims during trial). 
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trial.181 The ICTY and ICTR do not permit the introduction of evi-
dence of prior sexual conduct of an alleged rape victim.182 The ICC 
rule is more comprehensive and does not admit evidence of prior or 
subsequent sexual activity.183 Accordingly, the ICC and SCSL rules pro-
hibit a court from using a victim’s sexual history to determine issues of 
credibility, character, or sexual predisposition.184 
 the 
pe
 
D. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
 A victim’s post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) presents another 
opportunity for defense attorneys to undermine a victim’s credibility. In 
two cases, although the accused attempted to use this approach to limit 
the validity of rape victims’ testimony, the trial and appellate panels re-
jected these attempts.185 For example, in the 1998 Prosecutor v. Fu-
rundžija ICTY trial judgment, the trial panel assessed whether a rape 
victim suffering with PTSD could be a reliable witness.186 Four expert 
witnesses testified on this matter at a hearing.187 The trial chamber 
ruled that the testimony of persons suffering from PTSD is not “neces-
sarily inaccurate.”188 Accordingly, the trial panel reasoned that a person 
with PTSD is still capable of being a reliable witness.189 On appeal,
ap llate panel affirmed the trial chamber’s ruling on this issue.190 
 A related argument was raised in the Kunarac appeal judgment.191 
The appellant submitted that it was error to rely on the testimony of 
rape victims due to their young age and the traumatic experience they 
                                                                                                                     
181 See infra notes 182–184 and accompanying text. This view is consistent with the 
app
it-
ted . Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia R. P. & 
Evi d in evidence.”). 
 No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 98, 122–123(Int’l Crim. 
Trib y.org/x/cases/furundzija/ 
acju pdf. 
o. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 96–106. 
 95. 
¶ 122–123. 
 Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 272. 
roach taken in national jurisdictions. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 276 
(Can.); Dressler, supra note 16, §§ 33.01[B], 33.07[B], at 568, 591–93. 
182 See Crim. P. Code of Bosn. & Herz. art. 264(1) (2003) (“The evidence offered to 
prove that injured party was engaged in other events related to sexual behavior and to 
prove a sexual predisposition of the injured party is not admissible.”); Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for Rwanda R. P. & Evid. 96(iv) (“Prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be adm
in evidence or as defence.”); Int’l Crim
d. 96(iv) (“[P]rior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitte
183 See Int’l Crim. Ct. R. P. & Evid. 71. 
184 See id. 70(d); Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone R. P. & Evid. 96(iv). 
185 See Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 272, 279, 281; 
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case
. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000), http://www.ict
g/en/fur-aj000721e.
186 Furundžija, N
187 Id. ¶
188 Id. ¶ 109. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. ¶
191 See Kunarac, Case
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su red.ffe
 from 
PTSD. As such, the tribunals have been sensitive to these problems in 
determining the relia  testimony.194 
 crime of rape is gen-
der neutral under international law is consistent with the modern and 
prevailing view in many
pe. This Part offers some 
recommendations and shows that although some of these changes are 
straightforward, others are
192 The appeals chamber again rejected this claim, determining 
that the trial chamber could have properly relied on such testimony.193 
 These tribunals understand that the alleged crimes before them 
occurred during armed conflicts. They also recognize that certain vic-
tims and witnesses have been severely traumatized and suffer
bility of victims and witnesses’
E. Gender-Neutral Evaluations 
 International courts and tribunals in general view the crime of 
rape as gender neutral. As noted above, the definitions of rape in the 
ICTR (as evidenced by the Prosecutor v. Akayesu trial judgment) and in 
the ICC apply to both male and female victims.195 The Furundžija trial 
judgment, in which the ICTY trial panel surveyed the law of rape in ma-
jor legal systems, noted that the laws of some countries allow for males 
to be victims of rape.196 Although the panel did not indicate whether it 
would adopt this position, later ICTY cases convicted the accused of 
raping male victims.197 Thus, the notion that the
 national jurisdictions.198 
IV. Recommendations 
 A number of modifications are needed to improve or update the 
laws or procedures relating to the crime of ra
 more complex.199 
                                                                                                                      
192 Id. 
193 Id. ¶¶ 279, 281. 
194 See, e.g., Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 564 (over-
looking minor inconsistencies between witness statements as long as the testimony re-
counts the “essence of the incident charged in acceptable detail”); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 142–143 (Sept. 2, 1998), http://www.unictr.org/ 
Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf (assessing inconsistencies in 
victims’ testimony in light of presumed post-traumatic and extreme stress disorders). 
195 See supra notes 21, 88 and accompanying text. 
196 Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 180–183. 
197 Id. ¶ 180; see supra note 88 (summarizing cases). 
198 See Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 180 & n.208; Deborah W. 
Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be Pulled and Replaced, 1 
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 207, 211 (2003). 
199 See infra notes 200–215 and accompanying text. 
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A. Rape Shield Rules 
 As noted above, rape shield rules have been established in many 
countries to protect victims from harassment and improper question-
ing.200 The ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence protect 
victims from inquiry into their sexual history prior to the alleged 
rape.201 But, because the crimes alleged at those tribunals occurred in 
the 1990s, a more comprehensive form of protection is needed for vic-
tims. For example, the rules should be amended to prevent inquiry as 
to sexual activity that occurre t to the alleged crime. This 
change would bring the rules i he more progressive position 
ke
nating a pregnancy. A victim’s reasoning for not terminating a preg-
nan es relating to the crime of 
                                                 
d subsequen
n line with t
ta n by the ICC and SCSL.202 
B. Abortion 
 As the rape shield rules demonstrate, victims must be protected 
from unfair and emotionally charged attacks on their credibility. The 
2008 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina case of Prosecutor v. Vuković illus-
trates the need for such protection.203 In that case, a panel considered 
as relevant to the issue of credibility the fact that the victim did not ob-
tain an abortion.204 The victim testified that she was raped on several 
occasions by the accused and was eventually able to flee to a safer 
area.205 After learning that she was pregnant, the victim gave birth to a 
child whom she then refused to see.206 The court found that her failure 
to terminate her pregnancy was a factor negatively affecting her credi-
ility 207b .  Even though the court recognized that there may have been 
moral or religious reasons for not terminating her pregnancy, it never-
theless concluded that the victim was still expected to explain the rea-
sons for her decision.208 
 The issue of abortion is a highly sensitive topic, and the court was 
correct in recognizing that there may be many reasons for not termi-
cy, is not, however, probative of the issu
                                                                     
pra note 182 and accompanying text. 
tes 183–184 and accompanying text. 
o. X-KRŽ-05/217, Trial Verdict, 5, 7–9 (Court of Bosn. & Herz. Aug. 13, 
200
. 
200 See supra notes 178–184 and accompanying text. 
201 See su
202 See supra no
203 See Case N
8). 
204 Id. at 8–9
205 Id. at 5–6. 
206 Id. at 6. 
207 Id. at 8. 
208 Id. at 8–9. 
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rape.209 Furthermore, because this matter is not relevant to either the 
issue of credibility or the element of lack of consent, it should not be 
considered in cases where the crime of rape is alleged. 
established similar require-
to the lack of consent, 
ga
                                                                                                                     
C. The Issue of Consent 
 The final recommendation concerns issues relating to consent (or 
the lack thereof). The Prosecutor v. Kunarac ICTY trial judgment added a 
two-part mens rea element to the crime of rape that requires the prose-
cutor to prove that the accused knew that the sexual penetration was 
not consensual.210 Other tribunals have 
ments through their decisions or rules.211 
 Notwithstanding the decisions of these international tribunals, a 
mens rea element requiring knowledge as to lack of consent is unnec-
essary and should be eliminated. The decisions of war crimes tribunals 
provide no reason to support a special knowledge requirement, nor is 
there any explanation why it might be necessary in armed conflict 
situations. Moreover, many jurisdictions in the United States do not re-
quire knowledge or specific intent in relation 
re rdless of the surrounding circumstances.212 
 
209 See Melisa M. Holmes et al., Rape-Related Pregnancy: Estimates and Descriptive Character-
at, of rape-related pregnancies, 50% of women underwent abortions, 
32.3
os. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial 
Judg
Prosecutor v. 
Brim
tor must only know that his victim is not con-
 
istics from a National Sample of Women, 175 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 320, 322 
(1996) (finding th
% kept the infant, 5.9% placed the infant for adoption, and 11.8% resulted in sponta-
neous abortions). 
210 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vokovic, Case N
ment, ¶ 566 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001), http://www. 
icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf. 
211 See Rome Statute, supra note 84, art. 30(1); Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-
2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 152–153, 157 ( July 7, 2006), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/ 
0/Case/English/Gachumbitsi/judgement/judgement_appeals_070706.pdf; 
a, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 693 ( June 20, 2007), 
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=EqikfVSpLWM=&tabid=106. 
212 See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345 (Cal. 1975) (en banc) (holding that 
a statutory rape provision did not eviscerate the requirement of simultaneous act and wrong-
ful intent); State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 715–16 (Conn. 1989) (holding that for the crime of 
rape, the perpetrator must only intend the general physical act of sexual intercourse and not 
the specific act of sexual intercourse without a person’s consent); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 
745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 2001) (noting that “no mens rea or knowledge as to the lack of 
consent has ever been required” to determine that a rape has occurred); State v. Reed, 479 
A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me. 1984) (holding that “no culpable state of mind” is required when rape 
is compelled by force or threat); see also Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 1(1)(c) (U.K.) 
(providing as an element of rape that the accused “does not reasonably believe” that the 
victim consented). See generally Cavallaro, supra note 94, at 819 (analyzing different jurisdic-
tions’ approaches as to whether the perpetra
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 Although an additional mens rea requirement may be needed to 
guarantee fairness to an accused facing allegations of date or acquaint-
ance rape,213 that situation is quite different from the coercive envi-
ronment in an armed conflict situation. Moreover, the obligation of the 
prosecution to establish several elements beyond a reasonable doubt in 
de
 to the crime of rape and particu-
larly to consent, however, require further analysis and consideration 
than this short Article can pr
                                                                             
or r to obtain a conviction for the crime of rape adequately protects 
the accused. 
 Several other recommendations relating to the issue of consent 
could be discussed. One such recommendation is to adopt strict liabil-
ity at the ICTY and ICTR in cases in which the alleged rape victim is a 
minor or a person suffering from a physical or mental disability.214 It 
would also be beneficial to adopt a definition where the element of 
“lack of consent” would be a rebuttable presumption.215 In the latter 
recommendation, the introduction of evidence of consent would still 
protect the accused. Issues relating
ovide. 
Conclusion 
 To improve fairness and effectiveness in prosecutions of rape as a 
war crime, international criminal tribunals should adopt the substantive 
and procedural modifications outlined above. Some tribunals have al-
ready adopted various progressive policies such as gender-neutral 
evaluations and rejection of a resistance requirement. Nonetheless, 
these tribunals should strengthen other substantive and procedural 
rules to enhance equitable results and to better align with many modern 
domestic laws. Specifically, they should strengthen rape shield rules, 
forbid evidence of a woman’s decision not to abort, and eliminate the 
requirement of knowledge of lack of consent. With many more war 
                                         
senting to the act or whether the perpetrator must know that his victim is not consenting and 
that he is engaging in the act through force). 
213 See 2 LaFave, supra note 16, § 17.4, at 639. 
214 For example, the ICC does not require knowledge of lack of consent as an element 
of rape. See Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 85, art. 7(1)(g)-1 (requir-
ing no mens rea because “the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving 
genuine consent”); see also de Than & Shorts, supra note 155, at 359 (arguing for a rule 
that a child below a certain age is incapable of giving consent). 
215 See Sexual Offences Act, c. 42, § 75 (establishing a rebuttable presumption of lack of 
consent in certain situations). But see Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the 
ad hoc Tribunals 109 n.101 (2005) (“The question of true consent in the context of an 
armed conflict may prove a difficult one to deal with, but there may be no presumption that 
sexual intercourse between members of opposing parties is necessarily non-consensual.”). 
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crimes cases awaiting trial, war crimes courts and international criminal 
tribunals will have many opportunities to revisit these issues, and the 
jurisprudence will continue to evolve. 
